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Controlling Street-level Drug Trafficking:
Evidence FroiD Oakland and Binningham
By Craig D. Uchjda, Brian Forst, and Sampson 0. Annan
Two large U.S. cities-Oakland, California, and Birmingham, Alabama-served as
testing grounds for the effectiveness of
several different policing models for controlling the problem of street-level drug
trafficking. The National Institute of Justice
subsequently tested and assessed the models to determine their effectiveness.

tal neighborhoods decreased, particularly
for violent crimes.

The study examined the models' impact on
the reduction of reported crimes as well as
Itizens' perceptions of their own safety
and the extent of crime in their
neighborhoods.

Background

Police departments in the two cities used
special task forces and also "community
policing" techniques to identify and. arrest
drug traffickers. Generally, both methods
left citizens believing that police were more
effective than prior to the experiments.
Furthermore, crime rates in the experimen-

From the Director
Throughout the United States, a major
priority of police departments is the control
of street drug trafficking. Drug markets are
always accompanied by an atmosphere of
crime-including robbery, murder, and
random violence-that creates an atmosphere of fear within the community. Law
enforcement officials know that flagrant
drug markets on our cities' streets openly
challenge their authority and diminish the
public's sense of security and confidence in
police.
The National Institute of Justice (NU) is
engaged in comprehensive research to
learn which enforcement strategies and
tactics have an impact on street drug traf-

This Research in Brief highlights the
study's findings with an indepth look at
how two large police departments are
dealing with drug trafficking and drugrelated crime.

In 1987, Oakland and Birmingham received funds from the Bureau of Justice
Assistance (BJA) for support in controlling
drug trafficking. Soon afterward, NIJ
awarded funds to the Police Foundation to
evaluate the programs in both cities.

Oakland's Drug Problem. As in other
cities, drug trafficking has been a serious
problem in Oakland for more than a decade. Drug-related homicides have created

ficking and on the fear residents feel when
neighborhood streets are taken over by drug
dealers. In the mid-1980's, NU sponsored
some of the first research on "community
policing," which can be generally defined
as a method of policing that increases the
police officer's involvement in, and cooperation with, the neighborhood and its
citizens.
This Research In Brief describes the way
two large police departments have dealt
with the problems of drug trafficking and
drug-related crime. Police in Oakland,
California, and Birmingham, Alabama,
employed special task forces for identifying
and arresting drug traffickers. They also
incorporated, to a limited extent, some of

an aura of fear in some neighborhoods.
About 27 percent of the homicides committed in Oakland in 1984 were believed to
have been drug related. In 1987, nearly 50
percent of the 114 homicides were drug
related.
Crack cocaine emerged during this time,
with sellers and buyers openly dealing
crack in residential neighborhoods across
the city. Controlling street-level drug trafficking became much harder for the Oakland Police Department. The widespread
drug trade compounded existing enforcement problems for the understaffed department. Compared to cities of similar size,
Oakland ranked among the top five in
reported homicides, robberies, and burglaries per police officer.
To combat the street-level drug traffickers,
the Oakland Police Department put to-

the techniques of community policing. The
findings highlight the potential of policecitizen contacts both in stemming crime
and encouraging positive attitudes toward
police.
The findings of this study add to our understanding of drug traffic control as well as
community policing. They show that special enforcement strategies can be used in
combination with community policing
techniques to reduce some types of reported
crime, reduce citizen fear of crime, and
enhance the public's perception of police
services.

Charles B. DeWitt
Director
National Institute of Justice

gether "Special Duty Unit 3" (SDU-3), a
corps of hand-picked, specially trained
patrol officers who engaged in undercover
buy-and-bust operations, aggressive patrol,
and motor vehicle stops. As part of the
BJA-funded program, the department also
agreed to try a community policing approach, enlisting residents to join the police in controlling the retail trade of illegal
drugs on the street.
Birmingham's Drug Problem. Illicit
street-level drug trafficking emerged as a
serious problem in Birmingham around
1985. Birmingham drug traffickers sold
powder cocaine and Dilaudid, a heroin
substitute. Street-level trafficking was
prevalent in public housing areas, but not
throughout residential neighborhoods as in
Oakland. Also, drug enforcement in Birmingham was the responsibility of vice/
narcotics detectives, with as few as a dozen
narcotics officers responsible for controlling the entire city's drug problem.
In 1988, the Birmingham Police Department (BPD) embarked on a multiphased
program known as Operation 'Caine
Break, aimed at street-level drug traffickers. The narcotics division targeted buyers
and sellers through buy-busts and sting
operations. One precinct captain in the
study devoted a group of patrol officers to
a community-oriented approach.

Drug Control Through
Community Policing
To deal with the street-level drug problem,
both police departments expressed a desire
to use components of community policing.
Community policing, in this instance, was
limited to a few specific techniques, rather
than a philosophical change by the police
agencies. Certain elements of communityoriented policing were not adopted by the
police in either city. 1

1
Members of the police agencies did not fully
embrace the fundamental aspects of community policing, but expressed a desire to explore
its possibilities. Their efforts are more fully
described in Craig D. Uchida, Brian Forst, and
Sampson Annan, Modern Policing and the

Control of Illegal Drugs: Testing New
Strategies in Two American Cities, NIJ, 1992.

In Oakland and Birmingham, the community-oriented approach to drug enforcement involved the use of directed
police-to-citizen contacts. Both departments chose this strategy because of its
success in the Newark and Houston police
departments' fear reduction efforts,2 sponsored by the National Institute of Justice.
The police wanted to establish contact
with residents through door-to-door interviews to inform them that the department
would intensify patrols in drug-trafficking
areas. In addition, the police hoped to alert
citizens to the signs of drug trafficking,
and instruct them not to attempt to intervene personally when they observed drug
dealing.

Evaluation Efforts
At both sites, the evaluation used a pretestposttest quasi-experimental design. The
Oakland program included SDU-3 and
door-to-door interviews, structured so that
each aspect could be evaluated within a 6month field experiment in 4 of the city's
35 beats. 3 In Birmingham, three beats were
selected to evaluate Operation 'Caine
Break and the door-to-door contacts by
police.
The Oakland Design. In Oakland, four
treatment and control sites were chosen at
random. Beginning on May 1, 1988, and
ending October 31, 1988, Beats 7, 25, and
34 received treatments while Beat 11
served as the control site. In Beat 34, both
the door-to-door approach and the special
duty unit activities were applied. In Beat
25, officers applied the special duty unit
activities and conventional strategies. In
Beat 7, the door-to-door campaign combined with conventional strategies. In Beat
11, existing police operations were maintained at their preexperimentallevels and
strategies. After 6 months, the different
strategies rotated among the beats, making
Beat 25 the control area.

2

See Antony Pate et al., Reducing Fear of
Crime in Houston and Newark, Washington
D.C., The Police Foundation, 1986.
3

At both sites, beats were matched and selected
based on census data, crime data, drug arrests,
and police officer input. For more details on
target selection, see Uchida et al., cited in note
1 above.

2

The Birmingham Design. To evaluate t:I(
Birmingham Police programs, two police
beats were selected to receive treatment
and one to serve as the control area. Two
were in the South Precinct (Beats 61 and
62) and the third in the East Precinct (Beat
84). A survey of residents gathered
baseline perceptions of the neighborhoods'
crime problems prior to implementation of
the program. Beats 61 (Goldwire) and 84
(Gate City) received treatment, with Beat
62 (Kingston) serving as the control.
Operation 'Caine Break was measured in
Goldwire. In Gate City, the door-to-door
approach was measured. In Kingston,
current police operations were maintained
at their preevaluation levels and strategies.
After this period, a second survey was
conducted to find the effects of the
program.
Data. The researchers used observational
and official data to ensure that officers
implemented the programs and followed
experimental conditions. 4 To evaluate the
programs and determine their impact, the
research team relied on both survey data
and reported crime data. At both sites, a
survey panel of residents in each beat wa~
selected and interviewed at two different
times. 5 Research staff collected reported
crime data for each beat and for each city
as a whole to find whether the experimental treatments changed patterns of crime.
Besides these data sources, the research
team collected and analyzed newspaper
articles from the Oakland Tribune and
from the Birmingham Post-Herald.
4

In Oakland, a trained observer using a
structured observation form rode with the
narcotics officers on a weekly basis for a year.
In Birmingham, a trained observer rode with
detectives for 6 months on a bimonthly
schedule. At both sites, arrest data (including
all narcotics arrests), crimes reported to police,
and drug hotline calls (in Oakland only), were
collected for the analysis.
5 A systematic random sample of residents in
each beat in both cities provided information
about residents' perceptions of drug trafficking, quality of life, property and personal
crime, police services, and safety. Two waves
·
of interviews were conducted by survey
researchers. In Oakland, the overall response
rate for Wave 1 was 57.6 percent and for Wavp
2 was 75 percent. In Birmingham, the overall
response rate for Wave I was 84 percent and
for Wave 2 was 77 percent. See Uchida et al.,
note 1 above, for details.

0iice Techniques in Oakland
and Birmingham
1

Oakland's Special Duty Unit. Speoial
Duty Unit 3 (SDU.-3) consisted of six
patrol officers and one sergeant. These
officers perfonned many activities in uniform and undercover. To follow the Unit's
activities and ensure adherence to the
experiment, a trained observer rode with
the officers on a weekly basis for one year,
taking detailed notes of police-citizen
encounters.
The majority of the time, officers made
traffic stops of motor vehicles and bicycle
riders; questioned groups or individuals
who appeared to be engaging in drug activity; talked with residents about problems;
and engaged in stops and frisks where they
suspected violations were present.
During these high visibility patrol , twoofficer teams patroUed target beats and
used their discretion in making stops or
conducting surveillance. Arrests were not
stressed, but nonetheless could occur. The
officers spent the remainder of their time
n buy-busts and raids on crack houses.

Buy Busts. Buy-bust have been used in
Oakland to control drug trafficking since
1986. The typical buy-bust operation followed this sequence of events:
At the evening shift roll call, the sergeant
designated the areas for enforcement
within til target beats and assigned individual ta ks. Anonymous tips, patrol officer observation., and SDU-3 surveillance
helped detennine target beats.
Two officers, dressed in undercover c loth ~
ing, made up the "buy" team. With marked
bills, these officers mad undercover buy
of crack cocaine from dealers in res idenlial
areas. The rest or the officers were members of the arrest team. They wore bulletresi ·tant vests and windbreake1 bearing
police identiftcalion, and drove "semimarked police vehicles. 6 The arrest team
usually ituated itself just four or ~ive
blocks away f1·om the sellers maintaining
constant radio contact with th buy team.
' While the vehicles were not clearly marked
/~u·o.l cars. they were recognizable by mo~;t
suspects ru~d citizens because f their color and
style--LJSlllllly a gray or maroon Dodge
Diplomat with special antenna .

The buy team located dealers, infonned the
backup team of their location, and then
made a deal with the drug seller. Because
drug ll<tfficking was so r<unpant in the
early day of the experiment, it was ea y to
find willing ellers. When the buy team
was successful, it immediately notified the
backup team via hand-held radios. The
arre ·ring officers d1en moved in as quickly
a possible. Their speed u ually took the
sell r by c mpl.ete surprise. Officer ai o
arrested any buyers i11 the vicinity. The
entire operation lasted 5 to I 0 minutes and
was visible to the citizens in the area. Once
SDU-3 collected all the evidence, the
officers moved on to a new target. A typical evening in May 1988, th first momh
of operation, netted about 12 arrests.
During the summer months in 1988, SDU3 an·ests increased dramatically. The traffickers began to ch<mge their location by
111 ving a few blocks away, or they bjd the
dtugs in nearby hideouts such a under the
steps of a porch, in a brown paper bag or
in a cup) rather lhao on themselves. Mor
import:antly, tbe dealers beg<mto recognize
the officers by sighr and by nmn , causing
afety pr blem. for undercover officers.
By mid-Augu ·t the undercover officers
complained that Beat 25 had "dried up.'
Efforts then ·hifted to Beat 34 where traffickers were mor abundant.
l n response to the change in ta tics by the
dealers and their increased familiarity wilh
SDU- 3 different officers rotaLed into the
unit as "buy" officers and u eel several
vehicles in the operations. Other changes
in tactic incJudcd the increased use of paid
inf01mant . Officers que tioned suspects to
obuun informati n about new drug location · and traffickers.
During this period the unit arrested several
major drug traffi.ckers. By the end of th
summer, the observer reported visibl
signs f jmprovement in Beat'> 25 and 34.

Community Policing. In Oakland, six
police service technicians (PST's) were
assigned to conduct interviews and distribute pan1phlet: about drug trafficking in two
beats (7 and 34). 7 In Bi.m1ingham, six
police officers volunt ered to conduct
interviews and distribute pamphlets about
crime prevention to the residents of Gate
City, a public housing development. Questionnaires asked citizens about problems in
their neighborhood (particularly drug

3

Lrafficking), ab ut the whereabouts of drug
traffickjJtg, the relative condition of their
neighb rhood , tmd what they fell should be
d ne about the problems. ln addition,
Oakland Police di tributed a p::u11ph let
describing the signs of drug trafli king and
promoting their drug h tline.

to Oakland. initiaJ c ntacto; began on May
L 1988, and continued until October 3 L,
1988. During the 6-month period, officers
completed I Jl29 interviews out of 3,177
occupied households (57.6 percent). 8
These figures are comparable to those in
the Newark study, where interviews were
completed in 52 percent of the occupied
unit'iY

In both Oakland beats, "dmgs" were mentioned as an in1portant problem more than
50 percent of the time. Resident also
mentioned concern about other problems
associated with the drug trade: traffic,
peeding cars, noi e, sh lings and violenc , burglaries and thefts.
Complaints of dmg trafficking at specific
locations by residents were noted and
passed on to the SDU-3 sergeant. The unit
often used the buy-bust tactic at these
locations. However, completion of interviews did not mean that the "communityoriented" appr ach wa. fully implemented.
The police rarely had there ources to
follow up on the problems identified in the
urveys. The sergeant in SDU-3 did use
the questionnaires when selecting enforcement areas for the officers, but systematic
problem-s lving and followup with the
resident · did not occur. Because of Lhe
problems associated with the Oakland
Police Department's implementation of the
door-to-door component, one would not
expect this approach to be highly effective
in controlling drug trafficking.

1 Use of nons worn

officers rather than heat
of!icers 1.0 make door-to-door conLa ts runs
counter to standard c mmunity poli ing
techniques in other cities.
MUsing 1980 Census figures. Adjusting for
police observations of vacant househOlds, 65
percent of occupied household · were con-

mcted.
' Antony Pate und Wes Skogan, Fear Red/11:tion in Newurk. Washington. D.C.: T he Police
Foundation, 1985:27.

Birmingham
Operation 'Caine Br~k. ln March of
1988, narcotics detective-s began "Operation 'Caine Break" in selected areas in the
city. Th operalion was divided i.nt two
phas s: ( I ) the "straight-buy" approach
targeted at sellers and (2) a sting operari n
aimed at buyers. The narcotics detectives
carried out these strategies in areas where
street-level clntg trafficking wa highly
concentrated. They agreed to stay out of
the control area, Beat 62, Kingston, and the
d r-to-door only area, Beat 84 Gate City,
for a 9-month period.

During Phase I, undercover officers used
unmarked vehicle equipped with video
and audio recording devices, and bought
drugs from dealers. Ea :h transa tion wa
recorded surrepti.tious'J y, with anests occun-ing only after everal complet d transactions with each seller.
The standard buy-bust operat1on her
consisted of this eq uence of vents. Two
undercover offic rs con timted the 'buy"
team. They used marked bills to make
buys-typically Dilaudid or powder cocaine. The officers drove a van with video
equipment hidden on th da ·hboard and in
th back of the vehicle. They bought drug
from dealers on street comers or in front of
homes. The rest of the officers were me~n
bers of Lhe backup team that monitored the
buy team U1rough radio contact. Thes
officers situated themselves four or five
blocks away, well within striking di tance
if any problems arose.
The officers conducted this operation from
March 22 to July 29, 1988. The operation
culrnjnated November 15-17, 1988, when
arrest wammts for the sellers were served
en masse. 10
Phase ll: Sting Operations. The second
phase of the projectlnvol ved use of a new
piece of legislation enacted in Alabama in
1988. Prior to 1988, soliciting for the pm·posc of purcha ing dntgs was a misdemeanor. The Alabama Legislature, with
the assistance of the Jefferson County
District Attorney's office and l:he Birmingham Police Department, elevated the statu

10 'T11e time lag frotn buys to busts was due to
the paperwork and identification of tbe sellers

by patrol and nnrcotics officers.

ofU1e crime to a felony. Drug ' oliciting is
now ubject to the same penalty a if the
act of exchanging drugs actually took
place.
Narcotics detectives set up a sting operation, called "Operalion 'Cai ne Break,
Phase 11." During the peration, undercover officers po ed a street-comer drug
dealers, waiting for customers to drive up
to them and a k to buy drugs. A video and.
audio taping machine set up in a "boom
box - a Large, portable stereo ca, sett
player--documented the transaclion. One
undercover oft1cer held the machine on his
shoulder, acting as if he were li tening to
mu ic through stereo headsets. Inside the
machin , a video camera recorded what
went on. The head et~ were conne ted to a
radio transmitter that allowed the officer to
listen to instructions from the surveillance
ream parked two blocks away in an undercover van. The other officer, wired with
a microphone, spoke to the potential
offenders.
A ~urveiUance van wa always within sight
of the undercover officers, and two marked
poli.ce cars ~ere nearby. A total of 12
narcotics and patrol officers participated in
the operation. ln addition, ad puty district
attomey often rode in the surveillance van.
Narcotics detectives were extremely concerned about the safety of the undercover
ofticers and the legality of the sting operation. Extensive training took place before
implementation of the program. Patr I
officers and narcotics detectives were
taught procedw-es to ensure their safety,
and were requiJed to wear body armor. A
deputy distri l attorney pres nted the legal
aspe ts of the operation. Officer· parli ipated in role playing and a series of trial
runs to learn the proper procedures.
Ordinarily, a customer would drive up to
the undercover officers who stood n a
street comer where drug trafficking was
active. The officers would a ·k Lb person
what he wanted. Wh n he named a particular drug, the undercover officers would ask
to see his money. Once he showed moo y,
it satisfied the Alabama State law goveming drug solicitation: the deal was consummated. Drugs and money were not usually
exchanged. The undercover officer would
divert the buyer, suggesting that p lice
were in the area. This forced th buyer to
drive off.
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When the driver left the scene of the drug
solicitation, uniformed officers in a marked
vehicle stopped the car. At times, suspects
got traffic tickets for vi lations such as
driving with a suspended license, but no
arrests were made regarding dmg activity.
The suspects were told that the police were
making routine stops because the area was
known for drug activity and that the area
was dangerous. A videocamera strategically located in the patrol car recorded this
sequence of events. When the patrol officers asked suspects to get out of the car,
they placed them in front of the pau·oJ car
facing the camera. Thi ensured clear
pictures of the individual suspects.
Eighty-three arrest warrants were served in
De ember, charging 80 peopl with oliciting for the purpose of obtaining nar otics.
BPD officer were also able to seize 32
vehicles because the deals were conducted
while the buyers were in their cars. The
police then began civil forfeiture procedure to gain ownership of the vehicles.
In both phases, the BPD conducted largescale "bust-outs." This served to maximize
exposure by the media and to inform the
public and offenders of the police program.
The police hoped to send a powerful message to the community that drug traffickers
were being dealt with, and that both dealers and buyers were being held accountable for their actions.
During each arrest phase, members of the
department held a press conference. Newspaper reporters and television crews accompanied the officers to the homes of
suspects and recorded the arrests. The
Birmingham Post-Herald and the Birmingham News gave extensive coverage to the
bust-outs.
These bust-outs served other purposes as
well. By delaying arrests, the police protected identities of the undercover officers
from the dealers and buyers. This strategy
enabled the police to build strong cases
against both parties. Videotaping several
straight buys with each seller minimized
identification and evidentiary problems. So
too for the reverse buys. During Phase II
officers were particularly concerned about
testing the new State law and problems of
entrapment. To alleviate these concerns, a
deputy district attorney rode with the surveillance team and viewed all videotapes
before filing charges.

.::::ommunity Policing. In Binningham,
police selected a public housing development for the directed police-citizen contacts, or door-to-door interviews. During
the five-month period officers completed
344 interviews out of 598 dwelling units
(57 .5 percent).''
In discussing neighborhood problems, a
plurality of residents mentioned drugs (44
percent). In addition, residents frequently
mentioned other crimes associated with
drugs-such as shootings and violence,
burglaries, or robberies.
The door-to-door interviews were completed as quickly and as thoroughly as
possible, but the followup plan to conduct
problem-solving was curtailed and eventually abandoned, due to changes in the
police organization.
Unanticipated Change: The Police Substation. During a 14-day period in August
1988, 11 people were shot at in Kingston,
the study's control beat. One person was
killed and 10 were wounded in 8 separate
incidents, most of them drug related. In the
1ftennath, the residents, the public housing
authority, and the police made changes that
affected the evaluation.
After the violence began, the Binningham
Housing Authority made immediate
wholesale changes-repairing street lights,
beginning a cleanup campaign, and transferring additional security officers to the
housing development, Morton Simpson
Village. In addition, the police increased
their patrols of the neighborhoods. Citizens
also held anti-drug rallies in August and
October to demonstrate their solidarity
with the police and the pubic housing
authority.
With the assistance of the Housing Authority, the police opened a substation in
Morton Simpson Village-an apartment
within the development, fortified by heavy
wire mesh and iron bars on the front door.
Four patrol units (eight officers) staffed the
station 24 hours a day. This provided constant police presence and visibility.

11
As with Oakland, this is a conservative
figure. Vacancies increased the proportion of
occupied household interviewed to 60 percent.

The substation opened at the same time the
enforcement and community-oriented
programs were implemented. Thus, the
second wave of interviews could still be
used to measure the effect of the substation. New questions were added, incorporating the changes. Since the control group
no longer existed, the analysis became a
comparison of traditional drug enforcement versus the new community policing
efforts.

Impact of the Strategies in
Oakland and Birmingham
The police and the research team were
interested in the effect these programs had
on community perceptions of drug trafficking, quality of life, satisfaction with police
services, fear of crime, and victimization.
To examine these effects, the researchers
used measures from the citizen survey.
Citizens responded to a series of questions
about drugs, police, and their neighborhoods, both before and after the imposed
treatments. Attitudes of the citizen panel in
each beat helped define the effectiveness
of the programs.

Citizen Perceptions
Drug Trafficking. In Oakland, SDU-3
and the door-to-door contacts had favorable effects on citizen perception of drug
trafficking. Drug trafficking as a problem
decreased because of the treatments associated with the special enforcement unit and
in the combination area. In addition, citizens in Beat 25 credited police with doing
a better job of controlling street-level sales
and use of illegal drugs.
In Binningham, the treatments prompted
few changes in citizen perceptions of drug
trafficking. Kingston residents perceived
that police had improved their ability to
control street-level drug trafficking as a
result of the substation. No changes occurred in the other areas.
Quality of Life. The treatments in Oakland had no perceived impact on residents'
quality of life. In Binningham, residents in
Kingston perceived that their neighborhood had improved significantly because
of the police substation. In the other two
Binningham beats, attitudes of residents
regarding quality of life did not change.
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Property and Personal Crime. Oakland
residents perceived that vandalism of cars
decreased in the combination beat and the
SDU-3 beat. The other three perceptions
remained the same. Residents believed that
sexual assault incidents increased in the
beat that included the door-to-door
component.
In Binningham, changes in attitude about
property crime were significant, though in
a negative way. Surveys conducted before
and after the intervention showed that
residents in Gate City perceived that an
increase in break-ins, stolen cars, and
thefts occurred. Conversely, in Kingston,
residents perceived that the number of cars
being stolen decreased. These findings
suggest that the door-to-door campaign
might have increased the awareness and
perception of citizens regarding property
crime. Because the residents were more
aware of the problems, they believed that
property crime had increased as a problem
at the time of the second survey. This
coincides with the increase in reported
property crime within Gate City.
Residents' perceptions regarding violent
crime did not change in any of the Birmingham beats.
Police Services. In Oakland, citizens were
more satisfied with the police response to
community problems in the area that received the door-to-door treatment only.
In Binningham, residents in Kingston
perceived that the police were more responsive to their concerns, helped more
victims, worked with residents to solve
problems, spent more time in the neighborhood, and kept order. These findings are
not surprising given the active police presence and visibility created by the new
substation.
Residents who participated in the door-todoor treatment in Gate City believed the
police were more responsive to their concerns and that the police were spending
more time on important problems in their
neighborhood.
Safety. In Oakland, perceptions of safety
increased because of the treatments in all
three areas. In Binningham, perceptions of
safety did not change. The relatively short
time the treatments were in effect might
have been the reason.

Additional Resident
Perceptions in Birmingham
During Wave 2, Birmingham residents
were asked additional questions about
police performance.
Residents of Gate City, Kingston, and
Goldwire answered questions about the
impact of the police substation. All the
respondents in Kingston had heard about
it, plus 83 percent of those in Gate City
and 74 percent in Goldwire. In all three
beats, over 72 percent of the residents
believed that the substation was either
somewhat effective or very effective in
reducing drug-related crime.

Crime Data: Oakland
To measure the impact of the programs on
reported crime, the researchers analyzed
data received from Oakland police over a
28-month period. Citywide and Beat data
for Uniform Crime Reports (UCR) Part I
offenses were provided for the 16-month
period prior to program implementation
and the 12-month period of the programs.
Citywide Crime Patterns. The number of
robberies reported to the police throughout
the city stayed about the same during the
entire 28-month study. Burglaries increased from a mean of 1,675 to 1,861 per
month, about 11 percent, and violent
crimes declined from 265 to 204, a drop of
about 23 percent. 12
Of particular interest are the numbers for
violent crimes. They show that homicides,
rapes, and felonious assaults decreased
during a period when other cities saw rapid
increases in drug-related violence. While
the research found no empirical evidence
to show that drug enforcement efforts
throughout the city resulted in this decrease, one cannot ignore the possibility
that the efforts of the Oakland Police Department and the community made a difference in the level of violence.
Beat 7. During the period that Beat 7 received the door-to-door treatment, a 25
percent decrease in violent crimes occurred, but slight increases took place in

robberies (+7.8 percent) and burglaries
(+8.6 percent). Addition of SDU-3 enforcement to the door-to-door component
during the next phase of the evaluation
coincided with a marked decrease in both
robberies (-41.2 percent) and violent
crimes (-19.5 percent).
Beat 11. Beat 11 served as the control area
during the first phase of the evaluation and
then received the police-citizen contacts
during the second phase. All crime categories show a decrease when this area served
as the control. When the door-to-door
component was added, no change occurred
in robberies.
Substantial increases in burglaries took
place during the door-to-door campaign
(40.4 percent). This increase in reported
burglaries may be attributable to the doorto-door contacts and may be an unintended
consequence of these interviews. Residents
may have felt more comfortable in talking
with the police and thus reported occurrences more often.
This beat is an anomaly, because it does
not follow the crime trends that occurred
citywide. The research team expected to
find crime patterns that were similar to
citywide data across all crime types; that
was not so. The Oakland Police Department could not provide any compelling
explanations for the fluctuations.
Beat 25. Beat 25 received SDU-3 enforcement during Phase I and became the control beat 6 months later. A decrease in
violent crimes took place when this beat
received the special enforcement, while
robberies and burglaries increased by
almost 20 percent. Without SDU-3 enforcement, robberies continued their upward trend, though the numbers appeared
to fluctuate considerably.
These data suggest that SDU-3 enforcement alone had little impact on the traditional drug-related crimes of burglary and
robbery, but seemed to have an effect on
violent crimes. The increase in violent
crime when the special enforcement team
was taken out of the area confirms this
theory. Increases in burglary and robbery
may have been the result of drug dealers
turning to these activities because their
income from drug dealing had decreased.
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These citywide data exclude the figures for
the target beats.
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Beat 34. The combination of SDU-3 and
the door-to-door police-citizen contacts
reduced the mean number of violent
crimes and robberies in Beat 34. Burglaries
increased marginally. Without the door-todoor component, the number of robberies
and violent crimes increased to their preexperimental levels. Burglaries decreased
by 9.6 percent.

Crime Data: Birmingham
To measure the impact of the programs on
reported crime in Birmingham, the research team analyzed data received from
the Birmingham Police over a 33-month
period (January 1, 1987 to September 30,
1989).
Citywide Crime Patterns. The number of
property crimes (burglaries, thefts, and
auto thefts) reported to the' police throughout the city remained stable during the
entire 33-month study. Violent crimes
(homicides, rapes, robberies, and aggravated assaults) increased during the study
period.
The pattern of violent crime is similar to
that in other cities that have seen rapid
increases in violence, particularly those
that are drug related.
Gate City. During the door-to-door contacts, violent crime dropped to about 10
per month but property crime increased to
69 per month. This represents a decrease in
violent crimes of about 16 percent and an
increase of 9 percent in property crimes.
When the door-to-door interviews ceased,
the trend continued: Violent crimes decreased and property crimes increased
slightly.
Goldwire. Residents in Goldwire were
subjected to almost 18 violent crimes and
70 property crimes per month before
implementation of Operation 'Caine
Break. Once the beat received the buy-bust
and sting operations, the incidence of
property crime decreased about 5 percent,
while violent crimes increased almost 4.5
percent. When the area reverted to its
preexperimental stage, the number of
violent crimes decreased while property
crimes remained stable. In contrast, the
data for the entire city during the postexperimental stage show that violent crimes
jumped by 58 percent and property crimes
increased by almost 17 percent.

These data suggest that the enforcement
efforts of Operation 'Caine Break may
have had a lag effect on the reporting of
property and violent crimes. Without such
efforts by detectives, the crime pattern in
Goldwire may have matched those
citywide.
Kingston. Kingston received the police
substation. Violent crimes increased by 15
percent during implementation, while
violent crimes throughout the city increased by 23 percent. Reported property
crime remained somewhat stable in
Kingston, but increased slightly in the rest
of the city. These findings suggest that the
police substation had little effect on actual
reporting of crimes to the police.

Summary
Oakland
In Oakland, the treatments affected citizen
perceptions of drug trafficking, property
crime, satisfaction with police services,
and neighborhood safety. In addition,
crimes reported to the police declined
substantially in one treatment area.
Residents perceived that drug trafficking
declined. Visible police presence improved
residents' perception of the ability of the
police to handle drug problems in their
neighborhoods. The door-to-door contact
with police improved residents' satisfaction with the way police handled neighborhood problems. Despite the fluctuations in
crime statistics in the different beats, residents in all three treatment areas believed
that they felt safer than before the treatments were applied.
The perception that sexual assault incidents increased runs counter to our hypothesis; the researchers had expected that
perceptions of violent crimes would diminish in the treatment beats.

Birmingham
The Birmingham Police received a tremendous amount of positive press coverage for
their activities in Operation 'Caine Break.
The two large-scale sweeps of suspects or
"bust-outs" were successful because of the
press reports and because the police were
able to apprehend a high percentage (over
90 percent) of the suspects they sought.
The narcotics detectives also believed that

they had sent a message to drug traffickers:
That police fully intended to apprehend,
charge, and convict both the dealers and
the buyers in the drug trade.
In both phases of the operation under NIJ
study, the narcotics detectives were welltrained, organized, and thorough in their
work. Their concerns for safety impressed
the research staff, given the dangers inherent in drug enforcement activities. Equally
impressive was the concern to follow
proper legal procedures. Issues of entrapment, search and seizure, stop and frisk,
proper field interrogations, and probable
cause were discussed and emphasized
throughout the project.
Because of the nature of narcotics work,
the researchers did not anticipate significant changes in the attitudes of the residents in the area that received the 'Caine
Break treatment. Narcotics officers relied
on a low-key approach to their undercover
operations of stings and the videotaped
buys. Residents would not see arrests
regularly, so the impact on community
attitudes was limited.
Instead, the research team relied on reported crime as an indicator of success or
failure of the operation. Team members
believe that a reduction in crime took place
after a lag of 3 months in the area that
received the buy-busts and sting operation.
The patterns that emerge in the crime data
discussed earlier suggest that the door-todoor component had a beneficial effect on
the control of violent criminal acts. The
presence and visibility of officers in the
neighborhood may have reduced some
violent behavior. Although residents in two
of the three experimental beats also perceived less property crime, reported property crimes actually increased slightly in
the three beats as a group. This may be a
useful consequence of the door-to-door
interviews. Officers encouraged residents
to call the police when they witnessed
suspicious activities. In Goldwire, the
findings show that the treatment was effective after a 3-month lag.
Although the researchers had hoped for a
more intensive use of the police-citizen
contacts, the results were nonetheless very
positive. Though the police substation was
an unanticipated event, the demands from
the community and officials of the public
housing authority could not be ignored.
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Clearly, it affected the residents in the
Morton Simpson Village, as shown by the
results of our citizen survey.
The findings from this study show that
these treatments had dramatic effects on
citizen perceptions of quality of life, property crime, and satisfaction with police
services. In addition, violent crimes reported to the police declined substantially
in Gate City, where the police-citizen
contacts occurred.
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